

## **ORIGINAL PAPER**

## Accuracy Data of the Presidential Voting Outcomes to an Inferential Bias of the New Romanian Electoral Code and Electronic Vote (2014)

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### Abstract

The purpose of this study is to analyze the presidential elections in Romania, in November 2014, elections which have highlighted a number of problems of the Romanian society. For solving these problems there is an urgent need for the participation of all decision makers, local politicians and Romanian civil society. Election Code or electronic voting are just two of the debates, in the opinion of the author and specialists in the field, requiring special attention from both decision makers and the public. Perhaps the most important conclusion that emerges from our analysis is that no matter how secure victory seems for a party or a political organization, the electorate is the one who has the last word and can make a safe situation to become unsafe. Thus, although it was a difficult year for the local political class, 2014 gave Romania the first liberal president in its history of 140 years, in a complicated and agitated political context, practically exhausted by the struggle between a president-player and a dominant social-democrat party.

Keywords: presidential elections, voters, electoral code, diaspora, social media

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#### Aspects of the political context

The presidential election of November 2014 has meant the election of a new President of Romania, Traian Băsescu ending his two successive mandates on time, although two referendums were held for his dismissal in 2007 and 2012. Thus ended a busy period on the political stage, with much controversy and disputes, not few times the President being the one who maintain this state. Recent years have been for our country load of electoral events, transformations and political changes that has occurred in the context of premieres, surprises and twists of situation (Bărbieru, 2014a: 191), and 2014 presidential election did not come out of this pattern. Having as preamble the European Parliament elections, which had as central figures politicians who had to run for President (Bărbieru, 2014b: 134), the tour's results were however accompanied both in Romania and in Europe, by the word "surprise".

Naturally the question arises what exactly caused the loss of the election by the Prime Minister Victor Ponta, who had the first chance in carrying out its electoral commitments (Buti, 2015: 41). He was catalogued by public opinion and by independent institutions of public opinion polling, devoted to performing and publishing surveys regarding elections, the candidate with the greatest chance in winning the Presidency of Romania. In November 2014, PSD came after a period in which recorded an increasement in local elections in June and the parliamentary ones in November 2012 and a real success at the European Parliament elections in may 2014. Also, in his capacity as Prime Minister, Victor Ponta held important levers of power and had on his side an important number of local election officials (mayors and Presidents of the County Councils), the latter having a very important role in mobilizing voters (Buti, 2015: 41). Thus, it was considered that basically he did not have a challenger strong enough, and his victory was expected as a cert fact. 16<sup>th</sup> of November proved that it was not at all the case, and chances were played until the last voter.

National and international press has cited the victory of Klaus Iohannis, the candidate ranked on second place in the first round of elections, as a spectacular comeback in the second round, and his victory was able to amaze both local society and political class, as well as international politics class. The foreign press has reported extensively on the outcome of elections in Romania and foreign journalists could not overlook any incidents abroad, giving them wide spaces in media. Deutsche Welle reported that Romania is at a crossroad and the results of the presidential election will have an effect on the whole Europe, and the country is in a political and economic crisis. After 25 years of democracy, society was divided into the young people educated which were on the Liberals side, on the one hand, and the loyal voters of the "ex-Communist" Social Democratic Party, on the other hand. Deutsche Welle also stressed that Iohannis, a representative of the German minority in Romania and successful mayor of Sibiu, fights for Romania to remain in the European family and considers "social democrats barons" guilty of political and economic problems of the country (Bănilă, 2014). The German broadcaster has written extensively about the protests that were organized in Bucharest, spontaneous and in solidarity with the Romanian diaspora who were forced to wait in long lines to vote, but also about judicial independence promised by Iohannis.

#### The presidential institution in Romania

In Romania, the presidential institution is part of the executive power and is subject to the rules laid down in the Constitution of Romania. The constitutional system in Romania is characterized by two-headed executive, the executive power being divided

between the Head of State, the President of Romania, on the one hand, and the government led by the Prime Minister, on the other hand, their tasks being clearly defined by organic law (Iorgovan, 2005: 69). Article 80 of the Constitution defines the role of the President which represents the Romanian State and is the guarantor of national independence, of territorial unity and integrity, ensuring the observance of the Constitution and the proper functioning of public authorities. For this purpose, he shall act as a mediator between state powers and between state and society. Through Article 83 of the Constitution, his tenure may be extended, by an organic law, in the event of war or catastrophe (Constitution, title III, chapter II). The Government is appointed by the President on the basis of the vote of investiture granted by Parliament. The President of Romania shall be elected as a result of universal suffrage, for a term of five years which shall be exercised from the date of exerted oath, which gives legitimacy and makes it representative and legally equal to Parliament. The difference between the two representative bodies is that Parliament represents the people, while the President represents the State. The legitimacy conferred upon his election by the population is the main reason why we can say that Romania is based on a semi-presidential system (Avram and Radu, 2007; 300). The Romanian President is expressly vested by the Constitution, with the prerogative to represent the Romanian State both internally and externally (Constitution, Title III, Chapter II). In relation with the Government and with Prime Minister implicitly, its powers are limited. Between the President and the Government there are no subordination relationships, but only cooperative. Relations between the President and Parliament, under the Constitution, are reports which consist of messages asking the Parliament, convening and dissolution of Parliament, the promulgation of laws, as well as other duties that involve some form of cooperation with Parliament, as in the case of the referendum (Constantinescu, Muraru and Jorgovan, 2003: 77: Constantinescu, Jorgovan, Muraru and Tănăsescu, 2004: 146).

### Presidential election. Aspects of the election campaign

In our study, we will analyze, in particular, the events relating to the two main candidates to the Presidency of Romania, considering that a thorough analysis of all the candidates is not necessary.

On October 2, 2014, an online newspaper from Romania titrated on the front page "the 2014 presidential elections: last day of peace, the first night of the electoral campaign" (Marin, 2014: Politica). Now we can appreciate that being true this title taking into account the hardness of the presidential campaign in November 2014, many attacks used by both camps, social-democratic and national-liberal, arrived in the final round or distractions unrelated to the presidential debate.

Although in the first round have been enrolled 14 candidates, from 2<sup>nd</sup> of November remained in presidential race Victor Viorel Ponta (42 years old), the Prime Minister of Romania from the PSD-UNPR-PC Electoral Alliance, the Chairman of the Social Democratic Party, a candidate for the first time in the presidential election, and Klaus Werner Iohannis (55 years old), the Mayor of Sibiu, from the PNL-PDL Christian-liberal Alliance, President of the National Liberal Party, candidate for the supreme function in the State after the former President of the Liberal Party resigned.

In the 2014 presidential campaign faced two different strategies. Ponta has turned to known classical methods, involving a strong mediation of the candidate, negative campaign against his opponent, political advertising, and the deliberate incitement of positive or negative emotions. Iohannis has taken a different approach, atypical for the Romanian politics, which involves orientation towards the market, new trend in political

marketing. This included the notion of authenticity and missing spectacular speech. He wanted a campaign devoid of aggressiveness and negative messages, based on confidence in voter's evaluation, on the mobilization of youth and online communication (Mihalache and Huiu, 2015: 32).

Victor Ponta has officially launched his candidacy to the highest office in the State with great fanfare in the presence of more than 70,000 people on the National Arena, the day when he turned 42 years old. The launch on the National Arena was the reason for which he was harshly criticized by numerous political analysts, opposition members and even the President, Traian Băsescu. The opposition accused him of organizing an event similar to a Communist rally and compared him with Nicolae Ceauşescu or, furthermore, with the Korean leader Kim Jong-Un (Vintilă, 2014). He also has been criticized extremely rough for the very high costs required for such an event. Launch speech had centered around the ideas of change and unity: "We have 55 days and another battle to win, and I call on everyone to start on the road of change, on the way to the great unification of all Romanians," or "I want you to think of something we've forgotten in these 25 years: that we can be united, and help ourselves", "I invite you to join me in the great battle for the unification of Romania", etc. In addition, throughout his campaign he has kept the message from the European Parliament elections "Proud that we are Romanians" which called for collective emotion (Mihalache and Huiu, 2015: 35).

Previously, he had launched his candidacy in Craiova, in a National Congress of the party. His launch speech at the Polyvalent Hall of Craiova, from 29 July 2014, had inserted a series of messages of nationalist, religious, patriotic nature, but also regarding its draft as President. The main messages were built around slogans "Change to the end" and "Strong Romania" and its defining position remained the one with regard to the fight against the President, Traian Băsescu, and the end of his regime. We could define it as a campaign error because this campaign issue was no longer topical, as had happened in 2012.

Klaus Iohannis has launched his candidacy in the presidential election, at a rally organized by ACL in front of the Government, to which PDL and the PNL, in a desire to get closer to the performance of Victor Ponta launching, mobilized approximately 30,000 party members and sympathisers. The prime minister was refered to in all the speeches on stage, Secretary General of the EPP Antonio Lopez said that "Victor Ponta can not and must not become President of the European Romania". Klaus Iohannis's vision was "Romania of the job well done" and Lopez said about him that he was "a man of deeds, not of empty words", "a man of promises honored, not of scandal and show", "a man who builds, and does not destroy" (Manciu: 2014). His campaign themes were based on the words "can" and "less noise and less scandal, more seriousness and bending to the people's problems". In other words, it was about changing the way of doing politics.

The results of the first round were not surprising, following the path indicated by the institutions of public opinion polling. The result was the practical expression of political voting, Ponta managing to harness the electoral potential of his structure, the difference of 10 percent keeping him as the favorite (Buti, 2015: 42-43).

The day of November 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2014 ended with widespread protests both in the diaspora and in the country. They were driven by images broadcasted by media from polling stations abroad with voters who stood in queues to vote and by the Government's refusal to extend the voting program in these sections. There were protests in London, Paris, Munich and Rome. In Paris, disgruntled that they could not vote, several citizens forced the Romanian Embassy, the French police being forced to intervene. The images

of people beaten by French Gendarmerie for the simple reason that they wanted to exercise their constitutional rights have been sent to all media in Romania and on Facebook in real time. It was enough for generating ample reactions in Romania. Romanians protested in front of the headquarters of the Foreign Ministry and demanded the dismissal of Titus Corlățean, as well as of the Prime Minister Ponta, whom they blamed for the situation in the Diaspora.

No.	First name, last name	Party / Political Alliance	Valid votes	Percentage First round
1.	Kelemen Hunor	Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania	329,727	3.47%
2.	Klaus-Werner Iohannis	Christian Liberal Alliance (PNL–PDL)	2,881,406	30.37%
3.	Cristian-Dan Diaconescu	People's Party – Dan Diaconescu	382,526	4.03%
4.	Victor-Viorel Ponta	PSD–UNPR–PC Alliance	3,836,093	40.44%
5.	William Gabriel Brînză	Romanian Ecologist Party	43,194	0.45%
6.	Elena-Gabriela Udrea	PMP–PNŢCD Alliance	493,376	5.20%
7.	Mirel-Mircea Amariței	<b>PRODEMO</b> Party	7,895	0.08%
8.	Teodor-Viorel Meleşcanu	Independent	104,131	1.09%
9.	Gheorghe Funar	Independent	45,405	0.47%
10.	Zsolt Szilagyi	Hungarian People's Party of Transylvania	53,146	0.56%
11.	Monica-Luisa Macovei	Independent	421,648	4.44%
12.	Constantin Rotaru	Socialist Alliance Party	28,805	0.30%
13.	Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu	Independent	508,572	5.36%
14.	Corneliu Vadim-Tudor	Greater Romania Party	349,416	3.68%

# **Table 1.** According to the Central Electoral Bureau, in the first round of presidential elections in Romania were recorded following results

Source: Author's own compilation based on the Central Electoral Bureau (hereinafter BEC official data)

Throughout the two weeks of the campaign until the second round, the protests continued and had the main aim of overturning the result. The effect was of domino, the pictures in the media and on the internet have led to the historical changing of situation of 16 November (Drăgulin and Rotaru, 2015: 18-19). The theme of the vote of the diaspora was approached constantly by the Prime Minister's political opponents and the press. The Government and the Prime Minister were the main accused of voter situation abroad. The reason they did so was that they did not wanted a repeat of history in 2009 when Traian Băsescu was elected president with the help of votes from the diaspora.

On this emotional background electoral mobilization was exemplary, statitics recording the highest turnout since 1992 (Buti, 2015: 47). Klaus Iohannis managed to turn the result in his favor, achieving a clear victory and becaming the 5th President of Romania and the first head of state who belonged to ethnic and religious minorities. In the Romanian diaspora he has registered 89.73% of the votes (Canae, 2015: 142).

Victor Ponta was forced to admit defeat. His defeat was the more painful since it was the third consecutive time when social democratic party was not able to give a president for Romania. As in 2004, when Adrian Năstase, premier and party leader, lost the presidential election, history repeats itself 10 years later, in 2014, when Ponta, premier and party leader, lost the presidential election.

# **Table 2.** According to the Central Electoral Bureau, in the final round of presidential elections in Romania were recorded the following results

No.	First name, last name	Party / Political Alliance	Valid votes	Percentage Second round
1.	Victor-Viorel Ponta	PSD–UNPR–PC Alliance	5,264,383	45.56%
2.	Klaus-Werner Iohannis	Christian Liberal Alliance (PNL–PDL)	6,288,769	54.43%

Source: Author's own compilation based on BEC official data

## **Presidential elections in Dolj County**

The following tables will highlight the results of the presidential election in a restricted area, namely in Dolj County. The figures presented show that the County results of presidential election in both rounds had the Social Democrat Victor Ponta as winner. As highlighted in previous Articles in which the author analyzed the elections in Romania in the period 2012-2014 (Bărbieru, 2014a: 190-200; Bărbieru, 2014b: 134-147), Dolj is one of the counties in southern Romania where the Social Democratic Party came first in voter voting option in the last 25 years, regardless of the results at national level. In 2014 PSD won again the elections in this county.

Presidential elections in Dolj were not disrupted of negative events, being held in the normal range, with moments of excitement or failures that did not disturb the electoral process.

Social democracy was successful in all areas of the county, including Craiova where have been recorded 54,604 votes for Ponta and 37,814 votes for Iohannis in the first round. In the second round, Ponta recorded 78,660 votes in Craiova and Iohannis 77,201 votes, the difference between the two candidates being small. There were a few places where, in the second round, the winner was Iohannis: Apele Vii, Galicea Mare, Ghindeni, Giubega, Goiești, Mischii, Rojiște and Siliștea Crucii.

<b>Table 3.</b> According to the Central Electoral Bureau, in the first round of presidential			
elections in Dolj County were recorded the following results			

No.	First name, last name	Party / Political Alliance	Valid votes	Percentage First round
1.	Kelemen Hunor	Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania	796	0.25%
2.	Klaus-Werner Iohannis	Christian Liberal Alliance (PNL–PDL)	73,290	23.64%
3.	Cristian-Dan Diaconescu	People's Party – Dan Diaconescu	13,424	4.33%
4.	Victor-Viorel Ponta	PSD–UNPR–PC Alliance	173,687	56.03%
5.	William Gabriel Brînză	Romanian Ecologist Party	801	0.25%
6.	Elena-Gabriela Udrea	PMP–PNŢCD Alliance	12,119	3.91%
7.	Mirel-Mircea Amariței	PRODEMO Party	154	0.04%
8.	Teodor-Viorel Meleşcanu	Independent	2,581	0.83%
9.	Gheorghe Funar	Independent	683	0.22%
10.	Zsolt Szilagyi	Hungarian People's Party of Transylvania	272	0.08%
11.	Monica-Luisa Macovei	Independent	6,767	2.18%
12.	Constantin Rotaru	Socialist Alliance Party	941	0.30%
13.	Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu	Independent	15,306	4.93%
14.	Corneliu Vadim-Tudor	Greater Romania Party	9,121	2.94%

Source: Author's own compilation based on BEC official data

# **Table 4.** According to the Central Electoral Bureau, in the final round of presidential elections in Dolj County were recorded the following results

No.	First name, last name	Party / Political Alliance	Valid votes	Percentage Second round
1.	Victor-Viorel Ponta	PSD–UNPR–PC Alliance	226,696	60.60%
2.	Klaus-Werner Iohannis	Christian Liberal Alliance (PNL–PDL)	147,367	39.39%

Source: Author's own compilation based on BEC official data

## Social media

Novelty of November 2014 presidential election comes by social media. This had a marked influence on the election campaign and actually led to the twist of situation between the two rounds. The effect was unexpected and has to be considered for future elections because voters abroad which were mobilized through social network Facebook, proved an unexpected potential (Covaci, 2015: 85).

Klaus Iohannis is the first politician in Europe who managed to gather over one million likes, although in the first round had approximately 500,000 likes, on final election day about 850,000 likes, and immediately after the election, on November 28, reached a number of 1.2 million people who appreciated his page (Andriescu and Constanda, 2014). In this context, we wonder if social media has decided the final outcome of the presidential election. We think the answer is YES.

In 2013, the possibility of mobilizing the internet was underestimated due to lack of optical fiber that placed Romania on 23 rank in Europe, but in 2014 fiber channel connection managed to increase by 80% and reach 5th place, ahead of countries like Hungary and Bulgaria (Covaci, 2015: 86). Facebook, social network that was also present in the 2012 election campaigns (Ghionea, 2014: 212), Twitter, Instagram, etc. are known and used by a substantial segment of the population in Romania and distributed information come mostly from friends, companies or organizations in which the user is confident, having in this way, a greater power of persuasion.

Iohannis's online campaign has a well thought out social media strategy, which provided various and quality materials to supporters of the virtual environment, and consistency between the candidate image and message, between the message and the needs of the electorate was its strength. It has also been set a target -18-35 years, urban - and created a virtual campaign for this age group, knowing that is the segment the hardest to be persuaded to support a candidate or to exercise right to vote, completely uninterested in politics in general. The message was clear and consistent with the image of the candidate. The chosen strategy was determined by avoiding clichés, effective transmission of messages to the target group and focusing the reader on what differentiated Iohannis of his opponents, namely simple language and decency in speech and behavior.

Klaus Iohannis won the presidential election with the help of social media, Facebook being an important communication channel that managed to far exceed traditional media channels (TV or print media). People are more informed than 15 years ago, more open and unwieldy. After some analysts diaspora had a very important word to say, others think that the Prime Minister's mistakes had weight, and yet another group brings into question the charcater of candidate Iohannis. We believe that we must take into account all three factors. Also, social media has worked not for or against candidates, but sought a single candidate, and he was Iohannis.

## The Electoral Code - subject of public debate

Presidential elections in Romania, held on November 16<sup>th</sup>, 2014 highlighted the existence of various problems the Romanian society was facing, problems that require quick solving so things to be able to enter in a line of normality. Difficulties in Romanian electoral process, which recorded its peak in the presidential elections are determined by the existence of electoral legislation without consistency, with a large number of laws, governmental decisions or emergency ordinances (Pîrvu, 2014: 19). The large number of amendments to the electoral law through emergency ordinances, even if modifications were absolutely necessary, was mentioned by the Constitutional Court of Romania in

Decision no. 39 of 14<sup>th</sup> of December 2009 (Case CCR no. 39: published in the Official Gazette no. 924 of 30<sup>th</sup> of December 2009), Decision no. 61 of 14<sup>th</sup> of January 2010 (CCR Decision no. 61: published in the Official Gazette no. 76 of 3<sup>rd</sup> of February 2010) and Decision no. 51 of 25<sup>th</sup> of January 2012 (CCR Decision no. 51: published in the Official Gazette no. 90 of 3<sup>rd</sup> of February 2012) referring to the need to adopt an electoral code to unify the electoral law.

Thus, an Electoral Code to unify procedures for elections, political parties law, law on financing political parties, voting abroad and punishing the guilty for violation of the rights of voters in the elections of 2014 are problems in public discussion that policy makers must find answers in the shortest time.

For all of this to be achieved, it is imperative that new regulations and legislation provide transparent discussions, clarity, professionalism and be developed in consultation with direct interested factors (Pîrvu, 2014: 19). It is necessary that the electoral legislation include provisions related to computer system verification of CNP (personal number code) in real time, but also strengthening the rights of observers, reforming appeals and tools through which to reduce the pressures of local actors abusive involved in voting process.

Although electoral laws are constantly debated in the Romanian Parliament, the legislator failed until November 2014 into adopting legal norms allowing the organization of elections in which the possibility of fraud to become invalid. The last presidential election showed the limits of legislative and institutional framework and stressed the need for a responsible and courageous decisions regarding a substantive reform of legislation (Pîrvu, 2014: 20).

Another issue that emerged from the presidential elections was represented by the ease with which the right to vote of the Romanians abroad could be violated. Determined in this direction was the lack of reaction, delayed decisions and bureaucracy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Central Electoral Bureau, and especially poor organization of the vote, no polling stations and the lack of personnel in areas with large numbers of Romanian or insufficient personnel in other areas, and the transfer of responsibility from one institution to another, practice so often used in such situations. Unfortunately, the only sanction, if we can call it that, for the poor organization of elections and restricting the right to vote of the Romanians in the diaspora have been filing mandate by the foreign ministers Titus Corlățean and Teodor Meleşcanu, the latter starting the foreign office mandate on the date 10<sup>th</sup> of November 2014, in full electoral process, and registering his resignation on 18<sup>th</sup> of November 2014, just two days after the elections. It became very evident the need to introduce on the election agenda electronic voting or election by mail systems already used in the European Union.

In post-communist Romania have been several initiatives which sought exposure to public debate a draft of the electoral code to increase the predictability and transparency and simplify the administrative system, but all were unsuccessful. Further, political parties amended the electoral legislation in line with the interests of time, often changing the rules during the game (Pîrvu, 2014: 22).

It thus becomes imperative to align the Romanian electoral law to normality of the legislation, and the existence of the Electoral Code that will include clear rules and strategies that do not allow modifying them through various acts and amendment decisions, but with some time before the election, remains an issue that should be included in the folder for urgent debate of the entire political class of Romania.

#### Electronic voting - a necessity for Romania?

Presidential elections in November 2014 in Romania have raised a number of questions of civil society to which the political class and specialists must find an urgent reply. Is electronic voting a reliable system under current conditions of digital technology? It is a question that specialists and states try to find the correct answer given that, lately, more and more complaints have arisen in European countries. In this context, but having in view the obstruction of diaspora vote for presidential elections in November 2014, the obstruction to which we referred in the previous lines, the natural question arises whether Romania needs and can implement such a voting system.

In 2002, the European Commission urged Member States to use the electronic voting system through "CyberVote" Program, which was tested for the first time, as "AceProject" (The Electoral Knowledge Network) on 11<sup>th</sup> of December 2002 in the city of Issy-les-Moulineaux in France for local council elections, then in Germany from 13th to 15<sup>th</sup> of January 2003 at the University of Bremen and in Sweden from 27 to 30 January 2003. Electronic voting has been tested successfully in many other countries, Australia (October 2001), Austria, Canada, Estonia, France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and in 2011 in Norway. Of all these countries, a real success was registered in Estonia in 2011, when 24% of voters voted on this system (Chilea, 2014: 34-35; Trechsel and Alvarez, 2008: 1-19). Problems and suspicions of fraud on the voting system were recorded in some European countries, including Germany, a country which overturned the full use of electronic voting in March 2009; the Netherlands, a country which set off a wave of distrust against this system; Ireland who, after having introduced it in 2002, gave up due to suspected fraud; UK, who tried this method in some local elections, but not generalized it; Spain, Italy, Portugal, which have tested it, but have not adopted it by law (Chilea, 2014: 37).

Given that some countries receiving legislative stability, dropped or question this voting system, is Romania ready to adopt it, a country which, as we have shown, records legislative gaps and must take into account the particularities of its electoral system that requires the adoption of an electoral code? A number of voices of public opinion believes that such a commitment is possible, while other voices, those of specialists in the field, believes that what our country needs first is reforms to implement such a system and, consequently, using it widely and as a constant in the European Union so that Romania would have to adapt to new situations. The problems encountered and the scandal in the elections of 2014 generated a lot of discussion about the alternative voting system enabling efficient electoral process. In Romania electronic voting was used in 2003, Năstase government adopting an emergency ordinance (Government Emergency Ordinance no. 93/2003: published in the Official Gazette no. 716 of 14 October 2003) for the Romanian military in theaters of operations to be able to exercise their right to vote on the revision of the constitution (Chilea, 2014: 35). In 2007 there was the first parliamentary initiative in this direction, but without success, the proposal being rejected at the meeting of 3 December 2007 (Romanian Parliament: House of Representatives). To introduce electronic voting is mandatory to ensure adequate legal and institutional framework.

## Conclusions

Beyond the surprising result, presidential elections in Romania have raised in public discussion a series of problems that our country faces for a long time and must find urgent resolution. For a normal institutional and socio-political development Romania needs allowing ambitious political approach (Olimid, 2014: 76, Georgescu, 2014: 39-50),

with a political class where corruption is much diminished, and achieving the development of institutions within a given political system determined by changes in government and public policy making, with a healthy and sustainable society in which practices of past centuries must be totally eliminated (Gherghe, 2014: 123-133; Ilie, 2014: 203-212).

Another conclusion that can be drawn from the events in November 2014 is definitely the vote for change. Klaus Iohannis is unusual and somewhat a new figure on Romania's political arena, coming from Sibiu. His professional training, few and pressed words, the principle that has guided his campaign "less talk and more facts", rhetoric devoid of spectacular gestures are qualities that Romanians are looking for testing at a politician.

If the President Iohannis will conduct a smart foreign policy, and will reset the internal system by promoting sustainable reforms and removing corruption from all levels we believe that Romanians' need of change fulfilled its objectives.

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